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From: IntlArtCop@aol.com
Subject:

RE: Intrusion detection techniques

From your description, I'm not sure what you need. Call Optex Co. Ltd. (310) 214-2389 and ask if they still make a miniature photo electric safety beam product OS-1C/OS-2C (model number indicates one and two beam models). Ask them to fax you a cut sheet. It has a photo on it and you should be able to conclude if it is what you need. This is a tiny miniature sensor head and compact controller that projects a beam 33 feet (point to point) (13 feet reflected). It is the type of sensor that would stop a garage door from lowering if a child went through it or would open an elevator door if you stuck your hand in it. 12-24v AC/DC 110 mA max draw N.O. or N.C. output contact Form C relay 8 oz weight The head is 15 mm diameter (if my math is right, that's just over a half inch)
Hope this is useful to you.
Steve Keller, CPP
Museum Security Consultant
http://www.stevekeller.com

From: IntlArtCop@aol.com
Subject:

Re: guidedogs in training

In a message dated 2/27/99 3:39:03 AM, Tim Gette writes:
Does anyone have polices prohibiting "guidedogs in training" or does anyone have limits as the the numbers of dogs allowed in a gallery at any one time? (As the airlines limit the number of dogs in the passenger compartments?) We eventually had to ask the lady with the guidedog in training to leave the gallery and invited her to return as soon as the other dog left. She felt this was a very unsatisfactory response on our part. Any suggestions or help?
Does anyone have policies prohibiting guide dogs in training? I sincerely home not. You will be in violation of Federal law here in the U.S.
The airlines prohibit the number of dogs in the cabin. Yes, they do. They are specifically exempt from the Americans With Disabilities Act and this is specifically addressed in the Justice Department materials that accompany this complex legislation. Airlines are exempt from providing equal seating on planes and can even prevent a disabled passenger from flying. We are not airlines. The act specifically states that museums and historic sites are fully covered and in no way exempt from the act. This is not even left to the courts to decide. You asked the lady to come back later and she was not happy. You ask what you should do. Call your lawyer. You violated her rights. The law could care less that you had a good reason for doing so or that you were doing what was right or safe. You were wrong. If she sues you you will have a hard time defending yourself. The law requires you to find a way to accommodate her. If that means asking her to visit a different gallery from the trained dog, that is, staying in a different gallery from the one the trained dog is in, then you might be able to defend that request as reasonable given the fact that it was her dog that was disruptive. But you can't leave this traffic control up to here and you had an obligation to provide someone to assist her if that was what it took to separate the two dogs. Now, if the woman with the dog in training was not disabled but was just a trainer from an agency training dogs, then you have no problem. Your museum should have someone designated as its ADA compliance person. Discuss this with that person so they are aware of what you did and can try to defuse any complaint if it comes in. Prepare an ADA plan for dealing with such issues. Train your people to be sensitive to them. They will not always be cut and dried. Your people may have to use their heads. When in doubt, err on the side of accommodation of the disabled.
How do I know this? First, I was the subject of a complaint that went to the State Attorney General once (not a suit as it was before the ADA was implemented). I lost. Then, prior to the implementation of the ADA, I produced a video on the ADA and as a result I read the entire thousand or so pages of material that accompanies the act. It's a hum dinger and it leaves little in doubt about your responsibilities for accommodating disabled in your museum. Now if I may be less than politically correct, let me say something that is sure to make someone angry. Life is not fair. Some people get disabled. We all need to do our part to accommodate the needs of the 65,000,000 American's who are or will be disabled in the next few years. I fully support the ADA. But in my opinion, too many people who were totally insensitive in their life as an able bodied citizen become advocates willing to sue the pants off of anyone who doesn't immediately jump to attention and accommodate their needs when they become disabled. In my near lawsuit mentioned above, I met several people who had hair triggers about what they perceived as slights by the rest of the world. They felt they had an obligation to educate the world and did so with a heavy hand and a fancy lawyer. As part of the dropping of the complaint, I provided sensitivity training to my guards on disability issues and in doing so met with people from some of the advocacy groups. They were bitter at the world that they had a disability and were frustrated and angry that the rest of the world didn't stop dead in its tracks and accommodate their needs. I probably would be, too. It's human nature. But it isn't right. My point is that you are far more likely to be sued as a result of some minor violation of the ADA than if your guard hit someone in the nose. The disabled are, in my opinion, very litigious, and you have to be very careful or a minor matter will end up in court. Please don't flame me for expressing this unpopular opinion. My father was disabled and I have first hand experience with this. I do support the ADA but I recognize that people with good intentions make mistakes and shouldn't lose their homes over them.
Steve Keller
  • Museum Security Consultant
    http://www.stevekeller.com

    From: IntlArtCop@aol.com
    Date sent: Thu, 25 Feb 1999 22:03:01 EST
    To: securma@xs4all.nl
    Subject:

    RE: Checking handbags and backpacks

    Regarding the question about oversized bag checks at the Baltimore Museum, here is a little background on that subject.
    When I was at the Art Institute of Chicago, we had a constant problem with visitors complaining about us making them check their purses. For some reason purses were "sacred" and all you had to do to pull the chain of management was to say that the suitcase you were carrying was your purse.
    We conducted a survey on the steps of the museum for several days measuring purses. Our objective was to identify a size restriction that inconvenienced as few people as possible and still did not allow briefcases to be carried in. Gucci bags were the rage then and many women carried larger than normal handbags. We determined that 11 by 15 inches in either dimension was a reasonable size, and we instituted it. This was an effective survey, but we still got complaints. Nevertheless, complaints were reduced in number.
    (When the Suggested Guidelines were written, Gucci bags were no longer in style but knowing that styles change from minute to minute, we adopted the size restriction for the Guidelines knowing that it had been determined by a reasonable and objective means which we could defend more easily than just picking some subjective size.) To further reduce the number of people who we upset and to take the heat off of the guards who had to deal with the complaints, I asked the President of the Art Institute to write a one paragraph letter "To Whom, It May Concern", stating that we deeply regretted the inconvenience this rule caused but that it was necessary, it was not subjective, effort had been made to minimize the inconvenience, and it was supported fully by the museum's management as being necessary for security. Period. The guards kept a supply of these letters at each entry post (reduced in size to half sheets for convenience) and gave them out to anyone who complained. No debate. No discussion. Just, "I'm sorry for the inconvenience. Please read this." Complaints almost stopped. We may have had a complaint or two a year which the guard referred to a supervisor who filled out a complaint form which I personally answered. You can't please everybody. But it is my opinion that some people will complain about any restriction if they feel that some "dumb guard" (read that as "below my cultured and educated station in life") subjectively made it up just to harrass them. As soon as they see the policy in writing, and understand that the big bad guard didn't make up the rule just to make their life miserable. and that it really did come from someone in authority, most complaints went away. We could live with the ones that didn't because they were so few.
    To further reduce complaints and for the convenience of those women with very large purses, we purchased a supply of heavy duty, opaque (for privacy) plastic bags with handles that were smaller than the 11 by 15 inch size restriction for use by those who were forced to check their large bag. This allowed them to keep with them their money, which we didn't want custody of, and their make up or other items they need with them. This didn't make anyone happy, but it was a solution and it met the needs of the visitor in a reasonable way by accommodating them as best we could. We probably gave out five of these bags a year out of a million visitors or more.
    My suggestions to you is this:
    1. Have someone in authority in your museum prepare such a letter that you can give out to neutralize complaints.
    2. In the letter, explain that the policy is a national policy and is part of the security guidelines published by the AAM and ASIS which apply to all museums in North America. (The one argument we heard most often is, "I was at the Louvre last summer and THEY never made me check my purse!) No, but most museums in North America will, if it is over this size.
    3. Minimize the contact the guard has with visitors on this issue. Immediately direct complaints to a supervisor if the letter doesn't work. This signals that it is official and won't be compromised. Guards should not debate with visitors as they are rarely a good match to the visitor.
    4. Provide loaner bags for those visitors who your policy inconveniences.
    5. Include the size limitation in your published "Rules of Decorum" that you publish or post in your museum or keep for public inspection at your entry post or box office.

    In recent years, a few major museums have increased the size of parcel they will admit to the museum. I spoke with the Director of Security for several of these and asked that, out of principal, they not do this. It is very hard for the rest of the world to enforce a tight standard if a few major museums won't do it. One for all and all for one! But the museum's did not support me on this because, in my opinion, the management was not supportive enough of security. Someday they may regret their decision to allow larger parcels into the museum.
    Nevertheless, all of the museums that increased the size of parcel they will allow into their museum did so because they had provided some other form of security that compensated for the risk of a larger parcel. I'll explain this in a minute.
    The reason we felt we needed a standard was two fold. First, when one museum lends art to another museum, they have to know in an easy to understand manner whether the borrower meets certain standards of security. The best way is for us to define a standard that applies to everyone and then we can simply ask, "Do you comply with the Security Guidelines with regard to parcel control." If the answer is yes, we have a pretty good idea that security at the borrowing institution is at a specific minimal acceptable level. We can make decision to lend or not to lend with much more confidence than we could before the Guidelines existed.
    The second reason was that by defining the size as 11 by 15 inches, we were: a. keeping out briefcases while admitting most purses, and b. setting a size below which any item on display needed special protection.
    For example, as Director of Security, I could say to my curator, "If you want to display that item which is smaller than 11 by 15 inches in size and which can fit in some purses or containers smaller than 11 by 15 inches carried by our visitors, then I need to provide special protection, such as alarms, or hardware, or display it behind glass or in a vitrine, etc. In other words, no small object could be set out on a table or shelf. They had to be in display cases. Items larger than 11 by 15 inches, and too large to be carried out in a purse or diaper bag, could be displayed openly in the normal manner. For me as a security manager, I could then have a basis for asking for money to alarm or secure small objects. If the curator wanted to display an item smaller than 11 by 15 inches on a table, then he had to pay for extra protection for that object. My proverbial rear was covered. If funding was not forthcoming for the extra protection, I had done my part. I could show a logical reason for making my request for funding for that object. It was not subjective. If the museum chose not to fund my request and a theft occurred, I was off the hook. So the large museums that were relaxing the size restriction were doing so because they had purchased object alarm systems or had placed more small objects under glass, etc. They felt comfortable raising the bar so to speak.
    I know that this post may be confusing, but it might be useful for some of you to know the history of this issue. Also be aware that when we wrote the Suggested Guidelines, us old timers who fought these wars long before many of you were out of high school, felt that by addressing issues like this one in the Guidelines, we were giving you annunition to help you enforce these good practices we all know shouldbe enforced. It is much easier for you to get your boss to go along with such a rule if it is written into the Suggested Guidelines and was standardized than if you just set the size limit yourself like we had to do initially. And it is easier for you to fight for retention of such rules now, if you know the reason behind them as I am trying to explain to you.
    If anyone is having real difficulty in retaining or defending this standard and needs advice, feel free to call me in my office and I'll be glad to talk to you. I feel very strongly that this size limitation is one of the most important components of the Suggested Guidelines and we all must fight hard to retain it. The larger museums should have respected this as a national standard and should have understood the harm they were inevitably going to do to the smaller museums by not supporting the standard even if they have a fair reason for doing so. You and I as security practitioners can understand that by securing all of your small items you can allow larger parcels into the museum. But when one museum director from a small institution visits a major museum and sees that they do not have as stringent a parcel restriction as his own museum does, the fine points of security are usually lost on him.
    Don't cave in to complaining public. When the theft occurs in your museum they will be the first ones to call for your head. YOU, not they, get paid to be the advocate for good security. That means you have a responsibility to fight for what it right, not what keeps a reasonable number of complaints off of the Director's desk.
    Steve Keller, CPP
    Security Consultant
    http://www.stevekeller.com

    From: IntlArtCop@aol.com
    Date sent: Sat, 20 Feb 1999 00:04:24 EST
    To: securma@xs4all.nl
    Subject: Re: FEBRUARY 17, 1999
    In a message dated 2/17/99 4:51:15 AM, Tanny Evans writes:

    What are the important elements of a good post order?

    I assume that you mean General Order or Policy when you say "post order" so I am addressing your question that way first.

    Name of Order
    Date or date of last revision
    Purpose: "The purpose of this policy is to . . ."
    General Information: Any background information on the subject necessary. Responsibility: Who is responsible for what.

    Here is a VERY brief example (which lacks detail but gives you an idea of what is required)
    Policy on Visitor Sign In
    December 1, 1998 (rev. 2/19/99)
    PURPOSE The purpose of this policy is to establish a visitor sign-in policy for the museum and fix responsibility for its implementation.

    GENERAL INFORMATION

    "Visitor" for purposes of this policy refers to administrative visitors to the museum who enter non-public areas at any hour. It does not refer to members of the public who visit the galleries during open hours. All visitors will enter via the employee/administrative entrance. Administrative visitors cannot be accommodated at public entrances.

    RESPONSIBILITY

    Upon arrival at the employee/administrative entrance, the Security Officer on duty will greet the visitor and ascertain who they want to visit. The Officer will call the person being visited and verify the appointment and request that the employee meet their visitor. The Officer will have the visitor sign in on a Visitor Sign-In Sheet. The sheet must be neatly printed and must include all information requested. The Officer will examine the information on the sheet and make sure that it accurately reflects the verbal request by the visitor. If the Visitor is authorized to enter, issue a Visitor badge and instruct the Visitor to wear the ID card visibly on an outer garment at all times when in the building and to turn it in at any exit post when departing. Ask the Visitor to wait for their host to come and escort them. It is the responsibility of the Shift Supervisor to inspect the Visitor Sign In Sheet at least twice daily to assure that the sheet is being properly completed and is legible. The Supervisor shall instruct the Officer whenever the Visitor Sign In Sheet is improperly completed to assure quality control. It is important to understand that the Visitor Sign In Sheet may become evidence in court and quality control is important. The Officer at the Employee/Administrative entrance shall assure that a supply of Visitor Sign In forms is maintained at the post at all times. Forms are to be stored in the second drawer of the Officer's podium. Check the inventory of forms at the beginning of the shift. Call the Security Department secretary when the supply of forms needs to be replaced. Don't wait until you run out of forms. It is the responsibility of the Security Department Secretary to inspect the supply of all forms used at the employee/administrative entrance and replenish the supply as required. This includes having more forms printed well in advance of need. When forms are requested, have them delivered as soon as practical. An inventory of all forms used by the department is maintained in the Security Office in the forms rack. Master camera ready copies of the form are on the computer in a "Forms" folder. Since Visitors must enter via the Employee/Administrative entrance but may leave via any public entrance if the building is open to the public, they will turn in Visitor ID Cards at various posts. The Officer who closes each post is responsible for delivering the ID cards returned to his post to the employee/administrative entrance at the end of the day so a supply of Visitor ID Cards is always available where needed. If a Visitor leaves the building by an entrance other than the Employee/Administrative entrance and turns in a Visitor pass, the Officer at that post will radio the Officer at the Employee/Administrative entrance and ask him to sign out the Visitor on the visitor sign in sheet. It is the responsibility of the Midnight Shift Supervisor to reconcile the Visitor Sign in Sheets for the day with the inventory of Visitor ID Cards. This is done on the midnight shift after all visitors are out of the building. Visitor ID Cards are numbered. Any card not accounted for was probably not turned in. Add this card number to the list of cards no longer in service. This list is maintained in the security control room on the computer in a folder named "Visitor ID Control".
    See also: Security Department Definitions, ID Card Policy, Daily Color Codes, Forms Control Policy
    -----------------
    The above policy is just something I whipped off to give you an idea of what I recommend. Your policy will vary. I recommend that once you write all of your policies and procedures, you put them on your computer located in the security control room. Write them in hypertext, like a Web site, and at the end of each policy, add a "See also" section. The underlined policies above are representative of hyperlinks to those referenced policies so all the Officer has to do is click on the refrenced policy and he is taken to that policy automatically.
    Keep a hard copy of the policy manual in case the power fails or computer crashes.
    There may be other major elements to other types of policies but the ones I have included above pretty much cover every major type of policy you will run into.
    If Tammy is actually referring to "Post" orders, i.e., what every Officer needs to know about any specific post, then that information is much more specific. I like to include the following:

    Name of post: "Post 1"

    Map of post with area the Officer may patrol. (The implication being that if he patrols beyond the designated area he may be considered off his post and subject to discipline). Show all important features of the post on the map such as fire extinguishers, phones, rest rooms, fire exits, fire pull stations, etc. Primary Responsibility of Post (This is not always obvious to an Officer. For example, it may appear that the responsibility is simply to guard the collection when one major responsibility is to listen for an alarm on a fire exit door and respond or to remain close by to actually watch a fire exit door at all times.) Opening the Post: Special duties such as turning on lights, unlocking doors, checking fire exit doors to make sure they are not blocked before the public enters, inspecting the fire extinguisher, whatever. Closing the Post: often the reverse of the above. Special Duties of This Post: Example: "Check in on the Finance Office located within your post on an hourly basis". or "Pay special attention to the rest rooms as they are used by children". Other Post Information: Phone number, (whatever) Special Instructions: Pay special attention to the exterior door located in Gallery 3. No one is to use this door. This includes staff. If this door opens, a loud alarm will sound. Go immediately to the door and ascertain the problem. Hold the person using the door until a supervisor arrives unless the reason for the opening of the door is obvious due to an emergency situation. Notify Security Control immediately as you learn information. (Whatever.)
    I hope this information is useful to all of you struggling with the project of writing orders. Remember that you need to state the policy but you do not need to use this policy as an all inclusive training tool. It is true that the policy manual becomes a primary training tool but you can still use your training program's written materials to fill in the gaps unanswered in your policy manual. The policy manual explains the policy and who is responsible for implementing it and to a degree how it is to be implemented, but the training material that accompanies the policy manual really explains how to fully implement the policy.
    As usual, Tammy Evans is doing what many other museums think about but never get around to--writing a policy manual. Keep on asking those questions, Tammy, and keep up the good work and pretty soon the University of Georgia will be showing those big museums what to do.
    Steve Keller, CPP
    Security Consultant

    From: IntlArtCop@aol.com
    Date sent: Fri, 12 Feb 1999 23:45:53 EST
    To: securma@xs4all.nl
    Subject:

    advertising on the newsgroup

    In a message dated 2/12/99 8:49:10 PM, securma@xs4all.nl writes:
    **As a further to Steve Keller's mention of Security Training Manuals and his announcement that he is now in the process of preparing an electronic version of such a manual**
    I'm glad to hear that Roger Wolff has a manual available but I wanted to clarify something about the one I am preparing. As many people know, I did a manual and video training program for museums that is used in several hundred museums in North America. That is the Horizon Basic Museum Security Officer Training program and the one I think Roger incorrectly assumes is the one I am making into an electronic version. But that is NOT the manual I am speaking about. What I was referring to is a FREE CD-ROM that will be available at the end of the year. It is not for sale. Some companies give out ink pens with their names on them and others give out coffee mugs. We decided that a CD-ROM with useful material about museum security would be a nice thing to do as a give away item for museums. For us it is a way of keeping our name in front of potential clients. For you, it is free and useful. But it will be FREE.
    Now, my point. If the item I mentioned was not a free item, I would not have mentioned it on this newsgroup. I personally feel that this group should be relatively free of advertising and I have a bit of a problem when people announce "new" products that have been around for decades or promote items for sale on the group. This could get out of hand quickly.
    It is tricky for us consultants to participate in the discussion without being accused by some people of self promotion. My personal feeling is that if the consultant has something useful to say, then he or she is entitled to any free publicity that results from the answer given. Nevertheless, to avoid criticism, I often reply direct to the writer with an answer to avoid looking like I'm self promoting. Ton doesn't like this since it doesn't benefit a broad group of readers. But I prefer to do it that way rather than look like I am trying to sell something. I'm a professional, not a merchant. I feel that anyone who has been in this business more than a year, knows that I am a consultant so signing my name as such really isn't promoting. But there is a delicate balance to be maintained.
    I draw the line when it comes to promoting materials that I sell such as training materials and books. I'd just as soon put a stamp on a postcard and send it to readers if it nips in the bud the tendency to do advertising on this newsgroup. I'm a member of several other newsgroups (architectural and hypnosis to name just two) which have been taken over by advertisers and self promoters and I feel strongly that this one should not go that direction.
    So if you have something to sell, why not buy a mailing list and a stamp and sell it in the traditional way. Once a year, write Ton Cremers a check to help support this wonderful resource and then you are entitled to sell your wares--once--on the newsgroup.
    Steve Keller, CPP

     From: IntlArtCop@aol.com
    Subject:

    Manuals as "Works in progress"

    In a message dated 2/3/99 11:44:29 AM, securma@xs4all.nl writes:
    Mr. Keller is correct in that many Policy Manuals are a "work in progress".....but shouldn't policies be revised and updated frequently to meet the changes at the institution?

    Just so I am not misunderstood, what I meant when I said manuals are almost always a work in progress is that when I, as a consultant, ask to see the manual, I am almost always told, "Oh, we are working on that now," and I never seem to get a copy. No matter what manual or program I ask for, this excuse is given to cover the fact that while the Director of Security has been thinking about it and probably worrying about it, nothing substantial has been done toward completing it. Yes, they SHOULD be works in progress but only after one has actually been drafted!!
    By the way, we are developing a prototype manual for museums. It won't be a full manual that you can just copy, but a manual format to help everyone without a good manual get started. We will make it available to anyone who asks. It will be part of a CD-ROM that we are developing on cultural property security--also free to all--and available in the last quarter of 1999, as our gift to our colleagues for the New Year. The CD-ROM, to be formally announced later, will have tons of useful stuff on it including a virtual tour of a museum on a blueprint, with clickable links to policies, procedures, equipment, etc. that you see as you move through the building. It is being developed at a cost of just over $20,000. We were working on the prototype policy manual today as a matter of fact. The manual of the future will be on a PC (with a paper back up for power failures). Using a PC gives the manual much more functionality. When you read a policy on, say, "Dealing With A Fire Alarm," and another policy in the manual also has relevant information, there will be a hyperlink to that other policy, just like on a website. Click on it and it takes you there.
    We are in the process of developing a complete manual in this format for a major client. The disadvantage of this format is that if you need to update it, you will need to have mastered some hypertext authoring software like PageMill but this is not big deal. A day of tinkering and you can teach it to yourself like you did a wordprocessor. The advantage of this type of manual is that it is searchable, virtually idiot proof, and if you have to change something, you change it on the computer page and all electronic copies change, too. No need to distribute hard copies. It can reside on the museum's server, password protected or not, as you wish. Anyone interested in more information can ask me at the Smithsonian Conference. Otherwise we will tell you more midyear. Meanwhile, get busy on those manuals. You can write a good quality manual in a week. Close your door and "Just do it!"
    Steve Keller

     From: IntlArtCop@aol.com

    Subject: Value added services (re: presentation for upcoming security conference)

    In a message dated 1/30/99 4:24:24 AM, Herb Lottier writes:
    I am in the process of writing a presentation for an upcoming security conference. I also believe that each security Director worth their salt has developed at least one program that may not necessarily be security related but which enhances his or her departmental value to the organization. I wish to gather as many of these initiatives as possible and select the very best for a presentation, and perhaps publication, so that many can profit from the efforts of a few. I ask you to share your experiences with me You may elect to institute some or all of the programs as I intend to do. This is an opportunity to enhance the value of your security department (and you personally) to your institution and it doesn't cost you a thing.

    I'd like to comment on this concept. First, let me say that I am supportive of Herb's effort, and we all do need a repetoir of service-related programs we can use to provide what my colleague Dennis Dalton, PhD calls "value added" from time to time. (Dennis is not only a security consultant but one of a small handful of our colleagues who has "made it" in the big time as a management consultant with something to really offer to Fortune 100's outside the area of security management, so I respect his advice and reference him here.) Dennis feels that security departments, which are "cost centers", not "profit centers" need to have "value" in order to be respected by the profit center oriented people who run large organiztions, even museums. To do this, they need to perform some other task that is perceived as having value such as serving as greeters in the lobby as well as controllers of access or the flow of property.
    Herb's example of providing escorts to the parking lot for employees is a poor example since it is truly a security service whether real or perceived. It is not one of those "added" services. You all should be doing it if you need it or if your employees think you need it. Putting up signs is a good example since it is in no way a security function.
    My point is that in my vantage point as a consultant I see too many security directors who, unable or unwilling or incapable of doing the right thing, want to do SOMETHING, so they find some service oriented program that appeals to management and do it. The problem with this is that these value added services very often compete with REAL security responsibilities and harm the security program in the end by taking resources and time.
    Large museums with plenty of resources and management support--and there aren't many--can afford to do these things. Most museums can't.
    Some of the security directors whom I have seen provide value added services do it because they feel helpless that they can't do more costly REAL security duties and they want to do something so they do what they can. But too many use these services as an excuse because they don't want to tackle the REAL responsibilities of their job. They want to show that they are doing something without doing the hard work like writing a manual or training program. (This is not the case in Herb's situation so please don't read anything into this. He is from a large museum with considerable resources).
    Here is an example of a real world application of what I see happening. We all SHOULD be training guards but packaged programs are expensive and training one on one is labor intensive and time consuming. And, it takes time to write a program, keep records on who was trained, etc. So what I see happening is are programs like museums conducting CPR training for guards. Now I will not argue the importance of CPR. But is it really needed? You will argue that if it saves one life through the history of the museum, it is worth it, etc. etc. etc. No argument here. But you have a mission statement (don't you?) . You should be directing your resources toward the most critical risks, the ones most likely to occur, not ones that might occur but don't happen all that often or which if they do occur can be handled by others. In all my years at the Art Institute of Chicago, we only had two CPR events. (My people were not all CPR trained but I had several poeple on duty at any given time who were, and who could be dispatched.) I made a cost risk evaluation and decided not to CPR train all guards but to have a response team. It was based on the risk and an assumption that we were an urban institution and paramedics were only five minutes away. My point: We chose to put our resources into MUSEUM SECURITY TRAINING since that was a primary mission and the only primary mission not fulfilled by others. Life safety was also a primary mission but others were also charged with this responsibility, i.e., we had paramedic support minutes away. (I might note that both of the CPR events we had occurred when we had major exhibits such as the Vatican Collection where we had as many as 15,000 people in the building on a given day and during those major exhibits when our odds of needing CPR increased just by the increased numbers and the ability of paramedics to move freely through the building decreased due to congestions, we had a paramedic on duty in the building). Thus we had no CPR events in 8 years during normal operating conditions and visitor populations. I could not justify this program on a security department wide basis because it detracted from the overall mission of the department and consumed a major portion of my training resources and because others could provide this service.
    Now I know that my CPR example is a inadequate as Herb's parking lot escort example since both ARE security related value added duties. We should try to avoid debate on the philosophical issue of whether CPR training is our moral obligation, etc. I don't want to get in to that at this time. But the CPR example was appropriate as an example here so used it.
    If you are going to make a list of non-security value added duties and consider integrating them into your security program, you must first ask yourself if you really do have a security program. Too many security directors really haven't done anything that can be called a security program. Their policy manual is a work in progress, if that. There is no safety manual. A disaster plan, if in use, was probably written by the conservator. The training program consists of assigning a junior guard to some senior guard who himself has never really been trained and is given no guidance on how to train properly or, in all probability, what the right answers are. Post orders, if there are any, are probably just a list of work rules telling the guard about calling in sick or leaving post for lunch or how not to dress on duty. They rarely convey fire extinguisher locations or response priority information or other important data. If you do have manuals and programs, they are probably outdated.
    My point is that when you hear that a very large institution like Herb's is doing something, and you are director of Security in some smaller or less supported institution, don't be too quick to run out and adopt these value added programs. First get your REAL security problems resolved and then tackle these value added services. The real danger is that when a serious problem such as a theft occurs, you will be criticized for misdirecting your resources. TRUST ME! I've seen it happen all too often. Guess who is the scapegoat! The other danger is that the Director, who probably doesn't like spending money on security but knows he or she should do so, will embrace the value added services at the expense of real security and when the first round of budget cuts hit, guess which programs will go and which will stay. Finally, I see a real serious trend of converting security departments to visitor services departments. And providing value added services like escorts, posting signs, driving delivery trucks or transporting VIP's, etc. are the type of services that fall within a Visitor Services department more appropriately than within a security department. I know of two museums that embraced value added/visitor services programs and when times got tough found themselves converted to Visitor Services operations. In one case the Security Director got canned and in the other he has not gotten a respectable pay raise in years since he has no department of any size left, his security force now given to a Visitor Services director who does (poorly) what he should be doing.
    Value added services have their place, but I venture to say that not 5% of the museums in America should be providing them at this time but most COULD be providing them if they tended to the basics first and then adopted value added services judiciously.
    Just my random thoughts.
    Steve Keller, CPP
    steve@stevekeller.com

     From: IntlArtCop@aol.com
    Subject:

    Dr. No; stolen to order (Steve Keller)

    In a message dated 1/9/99 7:23:41 AM, a subscriber writes:

    It is interesting is it not that "The Collector" is always seen as a rich sociopath with nothing other than his own aesthetic gratification in mind. Ms Lowenthal states that "IN REALITY, no major art theft has been done to order for a reclusive nut-case." This comment is almost as worrying as the idea that Dr No could exist, in other words to say that it never has or could not happen is to bury our collective heads in the sand. In reality when we examine the world in which live, the depths to which humans can stoop in order to gratify their particular urges would make most peoples hair stand on end, why then do we strive so hard to dispel the "myth" that mr Big could be out there, whose only need is to possess something beautiful or outstanding. What is more likely and possibly more worrying is that Mr Big is probably Mr medium . . .

    George:
    I don't think Connie or I am implying that Dr. No never existed, just that the threat is over rated and over played in the media. It has been a means for many so called experts to get quoted in the press after an art theft even though they don't have the slightest idea of what they speak. There is a Dr. No out there, no doubt, who is rich and dangerous. But we have many many more Mr. Mediums, as you call them to be concerned with. We are not trying hard to dispell a myth about Dr. No. We are trying to help museums spend very limited resources wisely. It is called "criticality". It is more critical to guard against other more likely risks than against a Dr. No. And, if you do a good job tending to the minor details, you will, in the process, do a great deal to guard against a Dr. No if he is out there. I've seen several museums spend a fortune on exotic systems and safeguards to protect against threats thate often. In the real world we have to make these cost risk evaluations all the time.

    Read on . . .

    Mr. Sazonoff writes:
    Ms. Lowenthal raise an interesting point, there may be no "Dr. No". As for collectors as thieves or the contracting there of....There was the case of the student who pillaged French and Italian museums in 1990. He always wanted to own a Renoir; so he took one from the Louvre. There was also the janitor in Philadelphia who was found with important civil war swords, I guess he fancied himself a collector. He was not, however, a reclusive billionaire. In 1982 a Dr. Waxman of PA was arrested with 172 pieces of stolen decorative arts worth $2,000,000. Could that be considered more than a hobby? In the previous posting, the Marmotten was mentioned. Didn't they have a buyer in Japan? There was a rumor that Idie Amin of Uganda had a perloined collection. Also, at least one Picasso (stolen?) found its way into the hands of the late Pablo Escobar. I know of one Chicago dealer, arrested some years ago, having sent a thief to Field's Department Store to pick up some nice antiques for future resale. These are just a few examples. We still don't know the whereabouts of many great works of art . Perhaps "Dr. No" lurks out there; he just hasn't been caught.

    Perhaps this is so. Again, we aren't saying he doesn't exist only that in assessing where to put limited protection dollars there may be greater threats. But none of the examples you gave are Dr. No-sized individuals.
    By the way, the Philadelphia sword thief (Historical Society of Pa.) was indeed a garden variety thief who stole to sell to a friend. He didn't know the meaning of thw word "collector". And yes, there are collectors who steal, most notably rare books. There have been many celebrated cases. But there is a difference between Dr. No and a small collector. The implication by the literature and press is that Dr. No will go to any length to pull off the daring heist--as opposed to Mr. Medium's garden variety thefts. And this indeed effects how we protect the museum and how we allocate resources in a real world.
    By the way, I have worked with laundered money in my years in law enforcement but could never quite understand the advantage a criminal has in using stolen art as collateral in laundering money and moving drugs. I'm sure it happened and that's how the whole story started about this motive for art theft but I don't see that as common either. We always use it as an example of why we need to do certain things to protect our museum when in fact, if use of art as collateral does occur, it is a side issue of art theft and art is not stolen specifically so it can be used as collateral.
    If we are considering Mr. Medium as a Dr. No type character, then don't forget the museum professional as collector. I see many more thefts from my vantage point than most people do. My clients call me in and ask my advice after swearing me to secrecy about a theft they suffered. You never hear about some that I hear about. And I hear a great deal about scholars who steal and even an occasional curator who "collects". But these people are defended against differently than we defend against a Dr. No.
    I think that the motive of the thief (collector or simple seller of the art) is not the issue with regard to the original question that prompted this thread. The issue is whether some millionnaire is going to put his considerable resources into masterminding and carrying out a theft. The implication is that to defeat the alarm line to a central station, one needs very expensive talent and equipment. To make a getaway, one needs ways around Customs or money to bribe law enforcement. To carry out a Dr. No-sized theft, one needs an organization and resources. I just don't see it happening. I do see a janitor stealing swords to sell to the electrical contractor and (almost) getting away with it because of the same old garden variety security breaches i see in most small museums--and many large ones. I see fake cops walking in the front door of a museum and taking control of the guards because no one would listen to the Director of Security who literally begged to deaf ears for resources to correct problems he knew existed. I see Cezanne paintings shipped out of a museum to himself by an art handler because the museum lacked even the most basic access control, parcel control and internal security safeguards. But regardless of how dramatic or costly they may have been, these were all garden variety thefts.
    Steve Keller