Viva Blumberg: Lessons Learned
By: J. Steve Huntsberry
An Oklahoma native, Steve
Huntsberry has twenty years of experience in law enforcement. He joined the
Evergreen State College campus police force in 1980, and currently serves as
Chief of Police.
Huntsberry attended University
of Arizona where he received his Bachelor of Arts in 1965. The Vietnam
Conflict, in which he served two tours in the Navy, thwarted his plans to
attend law school.
He returned to the United
States in 1970, and began his law enforcement career working part-time as a
private investigator while earning another Bachelor of Arts degree in criminal
justice. Huntsberry later worked as a deputy sheriff, marine patrol officer, US
Customs Officer, and a Port Security Petty Officer with the Coast Guard
Reserve.
During his tenure at
Washington State University, Huntsberry became involved in the Stephen Blumberg
investigation. He gained national recognition identifying Blumberg, the most
prolific rare book and document thief on public record. He founded The
Huntsberry Association, and is also Executive Director of the publication, Focus
on Security: The Magazine of Library, Archive and Museum Security.
ABSTRACT
The arrest of Stephen
Blumberg, dubbed "the rare book thief of the century", stunned the
library community. The length of Blumberg's career as a thief, and the sheer
volume of his illegal collection, made an immense impression on library and
security professionals nationwide. Blumberg alerted us to our vulnerabilities,
prompting many institutions on an unprecedented cultural property protection
binge. Ten years later, memories have faded, personnel have left the field, and
cultural property protection is no longer the high priority it once was. It is
time to re-visit some of the lessons learned from Blumberg, and think about the
basics of Cultural Property Protection. Let us avoid another Blumberg.
DISCUSSION
This year's conference theme,
Cultural Property Protection from the Ground Up, brings back memories of
lessons I learned during the Stephen Blumberg investigation in 1988-89. The
aftermath allowed me the opportunity to address seminars and conventions across
the country about Blumberg's career as a rare book and document thief.
Certainly, the bizarre nature of Blumberg's tale generated interest. However,
the interaction with the audience, including their questions and 'lessons
learned', made the talks worthwhile.
"Blumberg phobia"
generated many questions, including: "What type(s) of alarm system should
we install in order to protect our valuable books and documents?" "Is
this alarm system better than that system?" "What do we do about keys?"
"How do we secure our ground floor windows? "How can we be sure no
stays behind after the facility is closed?" "How can we insure the
safety of our employees?" "How much will an effective security system
cost?" "Should we do background checks on employees?" "What
procedures should we employ to correctly identify rare book reading room
users?" "Should we utilize security personnel and what type?"
"Should we arm security?" "How do we train library personnel to
be more attentive to security issues?" "How do we recognize potential
thieves/vandals in advance?"
It continually baffles me,
however, that some security professionals refuse to adopt a proactive approach
to cultural property protection. Some folks still ask the same questions in
spite of numerous high profile cultural property offenses. Blumberg stole
nineteen tons of rare books and documents. Charles Merrill Mount stole $200,000
from numerous institutions, and librarian Susan Horn pilfered 6,000 library
books from her own facility. There are also the cases of Stuart Lee Adelman and
William Witherall.
And museums should not feel
left out: I mention Ronald Gerald Fuller, a convicted armed robber and burglar,
caught with at least $60,000 worth of antiques, coins and jewelry from various
museums around the country. The above list mentions just a few, and I mean a
few, of the predators who are/were after your collections. Do not forget
incidents involving gang members, vagrants, domestic violence offenders, and
armed robbers that plague your place of business.
Why must we even discuss
"Cultural Property Protection from the Ground Up?" How can we forget
what Blumberg, et al. did to us, and what is still going on today? We should be
'fine tuning' our security measures, not starting from the ground up. For those
of you who are proactive in the security of your facility and collections,
bravo! For those of you who are just starting, or are not quite there yet, I
have outlined the main lessons I learned from the Blumberg case. I also include
knowledge I acquired during my interaction with library and law enforcement
professionals over the past 10 years.
THE REALITY
The reality is that any
security system can be defeated, albeit some more easily than others. The
dedicated thief will "get you" if he/she wants you badly enough. It
makes little sense to rely on a foot-thick steel door latched with a dime-store
lock. One is reminded of the unscalable, impenetrable wall. The initial
impression by the amateur is that access is impossible. The serious thief
studies the problem, determines that the wall is only 50 feet long and,
therefore, may be bypassed by a quick jog to the left or right. It may deter
the amateur, but the professional will only scoff.
Blumberg taught us that book
thieves travel the path of least resistance. A thief will strike an area that
allows the most direct and unencumbered access to his goal, as well as an
immediate and easy retreat from the scene. When considering the best way to
protect a collection, it is simply not enough to install the biggest and the
best. As any military historian will tell you, once the enemy compromises the
Maginot Line, you have lost the battle. That means you have to be creative. In
order to stop theft in your facility, think like a thief.
I suggest the deployment of
multiple security systems to impede the entry and exit of potential thieves.
You should certainly purchase the best security measures you can afford, but do
not rely solely on one deterrent. Blumberg developed a system of thievery that
involved more than simply theft. Indeed, each stolen item reflected the expert
execution of a multitude of illegal and disingenuous acts.
He would first familiarize
himself with the physical layout of the victim institution. It is obvious from
the number of victims (280 plus) that few gave him much worry. Considering his
twenty successful years in the stolen book business, it was, apparently, not
difficult for Blumberg to determine the weaknesses in the defenses of his
victims.
Blumberg often would engage
library staff members in knowledgeable conversations. He would befriend them to
lower their guard, and estimate their vulnerabilities. Other times he simply
stole keys to areas that interested him by simply removing them from hooks or
desks in unoccupied offices.
A careful observer can discern
which staff member(s) hold master keys. They sometimes can deduce where the
keys are stored after closing. Blumberg understood that one did not have to
breach an alarm system to steal a key. The keys allowed him to bypass
sophisticated alarm systems with ease.
At the time of his arrest, the
Federal Bureau of Investigation discovered several library keys in Blumberg's
possession, including a Washington State University (WSU) sub-master key. Yet,
no one on the WSU staff reported the loss or theft of the key, which reveals a
serious breakdown in security control. Only one facility, the Clark Library in
Los Angeles, realized the breach in security and re-keyed the facility.
Blumberg also used to hide in
the facility until closing time, and then emerge to 'pick' locks to areas that
interested him. He mastered the 'bluff', and easily identified weaknesses in
the security systems. He capitalized on poorly trained and disinterested staff
members, and deployed several sophisticated false identification documents to
gain entry to archives.
Blumberg's modus operandi
included numerous illegal acts that law enforcement and library professionals,
as well as the general community, regarded as non-serious crimes. Indeed, libraries
generally regard each theft, unless it involves a significant number of
valuable books and documents, as a "slap on the wrist" infraction.
All levels of library theft, from stealing books and magazines to pilfering
security keys and staying after closing, occur in library facilities each day.
Unfortunately, libraries accept these offenses as the cost of doing business.
Equally depressing, few
libraries possess mechanisms that connect elements of crimes or detect
significant theft patterns. Few librarians or police officers demonstrate much
concern over isolated magazine, newspaper or book thefts by physically
unimposing, scholarly, patrons. Librarians and law enforcement personnel rarely
understand each other's roles and responsibilities in case of a reported theft.
Even more discouraging is that a dozen thefts could be handled by a dozen
different police investigators with no hope of any connecting conclusions being
drawn or patterns observed. Lamentably, a significant number of librarians
would prefer to deny that they are even victims when a theft occurs.
THE BULLS-EYE CONCEPT
However, most library
professionals want to know what they can do stymie theft at their facilities.
Two actions come immediately to mind. First, each institution, according to its
security budget, should devise its defense in a concentric circle
configuration.
The theory is to decrease access to assets according to their monetary and
historical value. Keep in mind that the dedicated thief will 'get you' if
he/she has the time. The counter measure is to impede and frustrate the suspect
in order to discourage or ruin his theft. The perimeter of the circles of
protection should begin on the outside of the structure housing the collection;
it should become more difficult to penetrate defenses as one proceeds toward
the goal. The up side to this is that the area to protect becomes smaller.
Logically, sophisticated and expensive alarm devices should surround the most
valuable assets. Just remember: if a $3.00 key can defeat your $30,000 alarm
system, then you need to implement stricter key control.
Once you generate these
circles of protection, you must ensure that potential thieves cannot
circumvent, confuse or deactivate them. Ideally, the thief who successfully
penetrates all the circles of protection would meet police officers in the
center, awaiting his/her arrival with congratulations for perseverance-and
handcuffs.
NOT ALL ALARMS ARE
ELECTRONIC
I truly believe library staff
and patrons of a facility should serve as the primary deterrent to library
theft. If the books and documents are to remain intact and available to the
public, the people who have custody must assume a personal stake in the
collection. The people in the trenches, including circulation personnel,
custodians, temporary assistants, and concerned patrons, all must assume this
personal attachment to the collection. They all must "take on" at
least a partial security role while performing their everyday tasks. They can
provide extra sets of security eyes and ears if they are conditioned and
trained to be alert to the environment around them.
Unfortunately, there are too
few "library cops" in the stacks. Most library personnel, especially
the ones who deal with the patrons on a daily basis, feel little passion, and
even less training, for their jobs. They may work in a library, but have little
awareness of what is occurring around them. Perhaps training would help library
staff recognize actual and potential library theft and mutilation.
A few concerned and dedicated
library professionals ended Blumberg's theft. A night-circulation desk worker,
not a library director, recognized Blumberg from a suspect wanted flyer. His
dedication led to Blumberg's arrest. A similar incident occurred at Washington
State University, where a Rare Book Reading Room attendant, rather than the
Chief of Police, discovered the thefts, and later the connections that
identified Blumberg as the culprit. Indeed, Blumberg's arrest consisted of more
than a few police investigators sharing information.
CONCLUSION: COMMUNICATION
AND TECHNOLOGY ARE THE KEYS
There is no reason why we
cannot create a general protective consciousness that addresses the problems of
library security on the local and national levels. Though there is much more
awareness now than there was ten years ago, there is still much to be done.
You should initiate a realistic security plan that employs the best technology
your organization can afford. Moreover, you should deploy your security
regiment in a versatile manner, and inform all library personnel about the
importance of cultural property protection. You also should develop a
relationship with your security personnel and the local police.
My final advice: network with
people in the library and law enforcement community, use the Internet, and,
most important, communicate, communicate, communicate!